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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s it was a widespread practice for Danish life 
insurance companies and pension funds (henceforth pension institutions) to guarantee a 
minimum interest rate on new pension policies. This practice was also followed in several 
other countries in continental Europe. The guaranteed rates were low by comparison to 
the high nominal rates that prevailed at the time; the guarantees were thus seen as a mere 
technicality and were granted to policyholders without charge. At the same time, pension 
institutions invested heavily in callable mortgage bonds that constitute a large component 
of the Danish financial system. Callable bonds allow borrowers to refinance their 
mortgages at par when interest rates fall and thus expose pension institutions to 
asymmetric interest rate risk. 
With the new millennium global interest rates declined steeply and equity markets 
came crashing down. The pension institutions were caught between several rocks and 
hard places. Suddenly both the guarantees on their pension contracts and the prepayment 
options on their mortgage assets were in the money. The policies already written could 
not be changed, leaving liabilities and assets mismatched, profits in the red, and capital 
reserves drained. However, it was not until accounting rules were changed to require 
mark-to-market valuation of the balance sheet and supervisory requirements began 
focusing on the ability of pension institutions to withstand stress scenarios that most of 
them started addressing the situation in earnest.  
Out of necessity, and in some cases virtue, derivatives have been an essential part 
of the solution, allowing for a more active approach to hedging, asset and liability 
management, and even profit generation. Through the use of derivatives, pension 
institutions have avoided the need to renegotiate their guaranteed contracts with policy 
holders. They have succeeded as an industry to transform their pay-off curves and 
emerged with better matched asset/liability positions and lower exposure to interest rate 
risk. 
The successful use of derivatives to hedge embedded options has positive 
implications for the offer of financial products that mitigate the exposure of policy 
holders to financial risk. But the expanded use of derivatives also raises some risk 
management and regulatory issues, such as operational and counterparty risks as well as 
effective internal control systems and regulatory oversight. 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the growing use of derivatives by 
Danish pension institutions as a risk management tool to hedge embedded options on 
their balance sheets. To set these issues in context, this discussion is preceded by a brief 
description of the Danish pension system and its regulatory framework. The main 
sections of the paper focus on the balance sheet composition of pension institutions, the 
“perfect storm” that hit pension institutions in all advanced countries in the early 2000s, 
and the financial impact of the use of derivatives. Three small case studies are used to 
illustrate different responses to the problems arising from the unfavorable market 
conditions. The concluding section draws together the policy lessons from recent Danish 
experience.    4
1  BACKGROUND 
To give a better understanding of how derivatives have been used to hedge 
embedded options in the Danish case, this section provides a brief description of the 
Danish pension system, its main institutions, and its regulatory framework.
1 
1.1  THE DANISH PENSION SYSTEM 
The Danish pension system consists of three pillars. The first pillar – the social 
pension – ensures a minimum pension for everyone regardless of employment status and 
history. It is a pay-as-you-go system and is publicly funded from general tax revenues. 
All Danish citizens are eligible for this pension from the age of 65. There is a basic social 
pension that roughly corresponds to 20 percent of average earnings and a means-tested 
supplement that may double the social pension, effectively ensuring that all pensioners 
receive at least 40 percent of average earnings. Additional support is provided through 
housing benefits and free access to the universal healthcare system.  
The second pillar – occupational pensions – is an integral part of the Danish 
collective bargaining system and is funded by contributions from employers and 
employees. Typically, the employer contributes two thirds and the employee one third. 
Participation for workers covered by different collective labor agreements is mandatory. 
The contribution rate varies with the specific plan. It has steadily grown over the past 
decade and the average contribution rate now exceeds 10 percent of wages. In 2002 77% 
of the labor force contributed more than 7% of their gross salary to pensions; up from 4% 
in 1998.
2 Most pension plans are based on defined-contribution schemes. Retirement 
benefits depend on contributions and investment returns. But pension plans also offer 
death and disability benefits. Payouts can take various forms: lump sums, phased 
withdrawals, or life annuities
3, depending on the specific plan.  
The third pillar – personal pensions – covers additional private saving. In many 
ways these personal pension plans resemble the occupational pension plans, but 
participation is entirely voluntary and the plans are funded solely by the participants, 
although favored by partial tax exemption. Like pillar 2 schemes, payouts can be as lump 
sum payments, phased withdrawals, or life annuities. 
In addition to the three pillars the Danish pension system also includes a number 
of statutory supplementary pension schemes. The supplementary schemes could be 
construed as being part of pillar 1 as they cover a large part of the population – in some 
cases much more than the work force – but their institutional setup and funding compares 
better to pillar 2 plans. 
                                                 
1 A more comprehensive description and analysis is provided in Andersen and Skjodt (2006) and Van Dam 
and Brink Andersen (2006). 
2 Danmarks Nationalbank (2006). 
3 One of the differences between phased withdrawals and annuities is that annuities are strictly personal. In 
case of death the remaining savings will not be paid out, whereas phased withdrawals will be paid out to 
next of kin. This has become a disputed point in some divorce cases as annuities are seen as a way of 
preventing ex-spouses from getting any part of the savings.    5
The Labor Market Supplementary Pension Fund (ATP) is by far the largest of the 
supplementary pension schemes. It was set up in 1964 to ensure all wage earners a 
savings-based supplement to the social pension. Later its coverage was extended to 
unemployed workers and other recipients of social transfers. Today most citizens 
between the age of 16 and 65 contribute to the ATP and are eligible for supplementary 
benefits. ATP benefits take the form of life annuities unless the saved amount is too small 
in which case a lump sum withdrawal is permitted. ATP pensions can be paid out from 
the 65
th birthday or deferred until the 70
th birthday. 
The Special Pension Savings scheme (SP) is the second largest supplementary 
scheme. It was introduced in 1998 as a fiscal policy tool meant to slow down consumer 
spending and increase pension saving. As economic winds changed contributions to the 
scheme were suspended in 2003, but while it was in effect, it was mandatory for all wage 
earners to contribute one percent of their gross salary. SP benefits depend on the size of 
contributions and investment returns. They take the form of phased withdrawals over a 
ten-year period with payouts starting on retirement. But like ATP, small accumulated 
amounts are paid out as lump-sums. 
The third supplementary pension scheme is the Employees’ Capital Pension Fund 
(LD). LD was established in 1978. Its objective was more an economic policy measure 
than a pension savings program. In the late 1970s most wages were adjusted upwards 
several times per year to account for rising price levels. The Danish government wanted 
to contain this very inflationary practice and decided in 1976 that only one annual wage 
adjustment to prices would be allowed and the rest would be frozen and held in LD 
personal accounts until retirement. From 1977 to 1979 two adjustments – amounting to 
DKK 7.7 billion - were frozen and later transferred into 2.5 million individual accounts in 
LD. Payout is in the form of a lump sum at any point after the retiree’s 60
th birthday.  
1.2  THE DANISH RETIREE 
The Danish pension system is built around the intention of ensuring an adequate 
pension for everyone. Established in 1892, the social pension is one of the first European 
public pension schemes and for many decades it has been the main income source for 
Danish senior citizens. Only since the 1980s have occupational and personal pension 
plans come to play a significant role in promoting financial security in retirement. 
However, this shift is seen as a permanent trend, as the table below illustrates. 
Table 1: Average individual income sources and distribution in retirement, 1997 and 2045 
 









National pension and public benefits  73  45  127  33 
Labor market pensions and individual savings  36  23  136  36 
Supplementary pensions  5  3  53  14 
Interest  and  Dividends  on  Savings  47 29 63 17 
Total  gross  income  161 100 379 100 
Taxes 40  25  103  27 
Net  income  121 75 276 73 
Source: The Danish Government, 2000   6
With the increasing importance of personal pension plans, replacement rates have 
become a more common measurement of pension coverage. Even though the 
categorization does not strictly adhere to the pillars of the pension system, figure 1 shows 
that net replacement rates will surpass 90 percent over the next 15 years and it will all be 
due to occupational and personal savings as the relative income from the social pension 
will diminish. The increasing replacement rates and growing savings are partly driven by 
a change in the general view of what retirement should be. People are retiring earlier and 
living longer, which in itself raises the financial requirements. In addition, the prospect of 
healthier and more active years makes for a demand for not only security, but financial 
prosperity in retirement, which can only be attained by personal savings. 
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1.3  THE DANISH PENSION INSTITUTIONS 
Life insurance companies are the most important group of pension institutions 
with over 40 % of total assets (Table 2). They are established either as shareholder-
owned joint-stock companies or as policyholder-owned mutual companies. Insurance 
companies typically manage employer-specific plans, which are negotiated with the 
employers concerned and cover all people employed by them. They are also active in 
offering personal pension plans. Multi-employer pension funds are created as member-
owned mutual companies and cover industry-wide plans. Although they have different 
ownership structures, multi-employer pension funds and life insurance companies are   7
subject to identical accounting, reporting and other regulatory rules and there is fierce 
competition among them.  
Corporate or single-employer pension funds cover the employees of single 
companies. They play a small and declining role. Many of them are actually run-off 
schemes, having been closed to new members and even to new contributions. 
Banks play a small part in the second pillar but have a stronger presence in the 
third pillar. However, they are not allowed to offer insurance products, such as life 
annuities. With personal pension plans becoming more popular, the part of pension assets 
managed by banks has been growing. Also, as mentioned earlier, a significant part of 
pension saving takes place through the supplementary pension plans that manage nearly a 
quarter of the accumulated assets.  
Table 2:  Assets of pension institutions, 2005 
Pension institution  DKK billion  Percent of total 
Life insurance companies  953  44.2 
Multi-employer pension funds  381  17.7 
Company pension funds  42  1.9 
Banks 298  13.8 
ATP 365  16.9 
SP 51  2.5 
LD 58  3.0 
Total 2,154  100.0 
Total in percent of GDP  138.4%   
Source: Danish FSA 
 
There is considerable concentration in the sector, although this declined in recent 
years as a result of new entry. In 2005 the top five institutions had a market share of 60 
percent, and the top 10 as much as 79 percent. However, the Herfindahl Index of 
concentration equaled 854 in 2004, having fallen from 1267 in 1995.
1 
2  INCOME STATEMENTS AND BALANCE SHEET COMPOSITION 
This section reviews the income statements and the composition of liabilities and 
assets of pension institutions from 2000 onwards. This is essential for understanding the 
use of derivatives to achieve a better matching of assets and liabilities.  
Future pension obligations are by far the most important liability on the balance 
sheets of pension institutions. These obligations were – in an accounting sense - not very 
sensitive to short term market fluctuations until the requirement to mark liabilities to 
market was introduced in 2003. However, the real economic sensitivity to changes in 
interest rates has always been substantial. With the embedded options stemming from the 
interest rate guarantees and other specific policy terms, together with more frequent 
valuation at market rates, changes in market rates now have a large impact on liabilities 
and required provisions.  
                                                 
1 Andersen and Skjodt 2006   8
Interest rate guarantees were introduced on new policies from the early 1980s.
1 The 
guaranteed interest rate was to some extent linked to the maximum technical discount 
rate used in the actuarial calculations of liabilities, and was set at 4.5 percent in 1982. 
New EEC insurance directives were implemented in Denmark in 1994, causing the 
guaranteed interest rate on new policies to be reduced to 2.5 percent and in 1999 it was 
reduced to 1.5 percent. 
Table 3: Pension Liabilities Distributed on Interest Rate Guarantee Levels 
  None  0 to 2 percent  2 to 4 percent  Over 4 percent 
Life insurance companies  3 %  25 %  20 %  52 % 
General Pension funds  2 %  12 %  31 %  55 % 
Source: Danish FSA 
As table 3 shows more than 50 percent of the accumulated liabilities of Danish 
pension institutions had a guaranteed interest rate of more than 4 percent
2. Furthermore, 
these American type guarantees could be exercised at any point before or at maturity, 
which added significantly to the provisions required to cover the obligations. In 1994, 
when the maximum guaranteed interest rate was lowered to 2.5 percent, most pension 
institutions also took the opportunity to switch to European type guarantees, which can 
only be exercised at maturity. Therefore the liabilities have a long duration and the 
composition is very difficult to adjust to changing investment return expectations, 
because policies already written cannot be changed and new contributions paid into old 
policies, under the terms of those policies, continue to be covered by the original 
guarantees throughout the life of the contract. 
The state of the liabilities is of course mirrored in the provisions required to cover 
future obligations. With falling interest rates and decreased mortality
3 the provisions have 
increased considerably over the past few years, putting pressure on investment returns 
and squeezing solvency. 
Table 4: Pension Obligations Return on investments and solvency ratio, 2000 - 2005 
Provisions for future 
pension obligations 
(annual change) 







2000 7.9  4.95  4.2 
2001 3.5  -1.2  2.4 
2002 6.0  1.71  2.2 
2003 7.9  6.05  2.6 
2004 11.4  9.11  2.7 
2005 15.7  12.46  2.6 
Source: Danish FSA 
                                                 
1 This practice was also followed in several other countries in continental Europe. The Danish pension 
institutions were not unique in offering these guarantees, although the size of the Danish market may have 
been much greater, relative to GDP, than in any other country.  
2 The majority of these carry a guaranteed interest rate of 4.5 percent. 
3 Like most European pension institutions the Danish pension sector has also had to adjust provisions to 
allow for the fact that policy holders are living longer than originally projected.   9
Bonds have always been the main investment asset for the Danish pension sector 
with heavy emphasis on domestic, callable mortgage bonds. Even though such mortgage 
bonds have a maturity of up to 30 years their callable nature results in a significantly 
shorter effective duration especially in an environment of generally falling interest rates
1. 
Because the effective duration of Danish non-government bonds is extremely affected by 
the prevailing interest rate environment, pension institutions have been adding duration 
by expanding their portfolio of foreign - mainly euro denominated - bonds since the turn 
of the century
2. This has of course also increased their exposure to global market 
fluctuations. 
The 1990s saw a deregulation of investment rules and thereby allowed pension 
institutions to place a larger part of their funds in equities
3. But since the turn of the 
century roughly two thirds of equity investments have been foreign. As can be seen in 
Table 5, this has introduced significant fluctuations in investment returns. 
Comparing return on investments to the growth rate of provisions the mismatch 
between assets and liabilities from 2000 – 2002 becomes evident. Provisions were 
growing far more than investment returns could cover, leaving the Danish L & P sector 
with the choice of either absorbing the losses by depleting capital reserves, thereby 
dangerously lowering solvency, or taking measures to bridge the gap between assets and 
liabilities. 
Table 5: Asset Allocation, DKK billion and percent, 1999 – 2005 
1999 2001  2003  2005  /1   
DKK    % DKK % DKK %  DKK  % 
Land and buildings  59.7  8  60.4  7  72.6  7  92.6  7 
Subsidiary and associated companies  21.4  3  26.4  3  11.7  1  10.3  1 
Danish  Equity  104.4 14 84 10 51  5  78.1  6 
Foreign  Equity  169.2  22 146.4 17 118.7 12  209.5  16 
Bonds  409.9  54 534.5 62 706.5 71  794.6  62 
Other  Investments  17  2 30.4 4 34.8 4  25.4  2 
Derivatives acquired for ALM hedging               67.9  5 
Total  762.6  100 874.9 100 995.3 100 1,278.4 100 
Notes and Source: Danish FSA. 
/1 The numbers before and after 2005 are not comparable. Reporting of investments in bonds, mortgages, 
cash and term deposits as well as derivatives changes from 2005. Derivatives are before 2005 included in 
the relevant asset category. From 2005 derivatives acquired for ALM hedging purposes are recorded as a 
separate category, while derivatives acquired to gain non ALM related exposures still are included in the 
relevant asset category.  
                                                 
1 For a description of the Danish Mortgage system see Ladekarl (1998) and Nykredit (2005).  
2 The duration of Danish bond holdings in December 2002 was only about 5.4 years, whereas the duration 
of euro bond holdings was as high as 28.8 years. Source: Nykredit Markets (2003). 
3 Generally pension institutions can now hold up to 50 percent of their investment assets in equity, whereas 
companies with high solvency can hold up to 70 percent in equity.   10














Table 6: Return on Investments, percent, 1998 – 2004 (old accounting standards) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Real  Estate  9.8 11.0 10.9 17.3 11.8  7.2 12.0 
Subsidiaries  3.3  14.5 9.7  -0.8  -2.3 1.0 5.2 
Equity,  domestic/1  -4.8 24.3 23.8  -15.9  -20.5 30.5 25.8 
Equity,  foreign  15.7 71.4 -5.9  -19.9  -30.1 16.3  9.3 
Bonds,  domestic/2  10.2  1.5 10.2  9.5 11.5  4.9  7.7 
Bonds,  foreign  9.7  0.8 12.5  7.4 10.1  5.6 10.4 
Total  8.1  15.4 6.5  -1.8 1.5 7.8  10.6 
Notes and Source: Danish FSA 
/1: Excluding private equity.  
/2: Excluding index-linked bonds. 
 
Table 7: Return on Investments, percent, 2003 – 2005 (new accounting standards) 
  2003 2004 2005 
Real Estate  7.2  12  23 
Subsidiaries 1  5.2  2.3 
Equity,  domestic  30.5 25.8 47.2 
Private equity, domestic  9.1  5.3  26.7 
Equity,  foreign  16.3 9.3 24.2 
Bonds  5.3 8.7 6.8 
Mortgages  7.2 6.9 4.5 
Other financial investment assets  -0.1  43.9  25.6 
Total 7.8  10.6  13.9 
Source: Danish FSA 
   11
3  REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The regulatory framework surrounding the pension sector has always focused on 
the ability of individual pension institutions to fulfill their future pension obligations. 
Pension institutions have two main sources of capital for absorbing losses without 
affecting the guaranteed benefits to policyholders: the collective bonus reserves that 
represent the undistributed profits that belong to policyholders; and own equity funds 
(paid up capital and retained earnings) that belong to the owners of pension institutions. 
The solvency ratio measures the ratio of own funds to the minimum capital requirement 
and is a basic indicator of solvency. The collective bonus reserves also provide an 
indication of the ability to absorb losses. 
Prior to 2003 neither of these measurements took the risk profile of each pension 
institution into account. It was not until 2003 that it became mandatory to use mark-to-
market asset valuations.
1 Considering the growing exposure to global markets and the 
potential impact of adverse market conditions, there was a need for the Danish FSA to 
find new ways to look at financial strength and capital requirements. The Danish FSA 
decided to follow the stress-test route through a so-called “traffic light” system. 
Table 8:  The Traffic Light System, 2001 - 2005 
Number of Institutions 
 
Red Light  Yellow Light  Green Light 
2001 1  40  49 
2002 2  11  58 
2003 0  2  66 
2004 0  6  59 
2005 0  6  59 
Source: Danish FSA 
The traffic light system was introduced in 2001. It requires pension institutions to 
report the impact on capital reserves and future pension obligations of two different 
market scenarios
2. If the institution is not able to maintain the minimum required 
solvency under the moderate (red) scenario, it will get a red light from the FSA. Same 
mechanism applies to the extreme (yellow) scenario, and either the red or yellow light 
will result in further inspections by the FSA and an increase in capital may be required. If 
a pension institution is able to withstand both scenarios it gets a green light. Not only 
does the traffic light system incorporate market risk sensitivity into the solvency 
assessment, but it also looks at both sides of the balance sheet, where a lot of the 
problems arose during the perfect storm of 2001/2002 as illustrated by the large number 
of institutions in Red or Yellow light during those years (Table 8). 
                                                 
1 A discussion of the evolution of prudential regulation and risk-based supervision of pension institutions in 
Denmark is provided in Andersen and Skjodt (2006) and Van Dam and Brink Andersen (2006). 
2 Red scenario: interest rate change of 0.7 percent, equity price fall of 12 percent, real estate price fall of 8 
percent in addition to credit -, exchange rate - and counterpart – related losses. 
Yellow scenario: interest rate change of 1.0 percent, equity price fall of 30 percent, real estate price fall of 
12 percent in addition to credit -, exchange rate - and counterpart – related losses.   12
The traffic light system focuses on measuring the impact of changes in interest 
rates and asset prices on the financial situation of a pension institution. Other changes in 
the regulatory framework have addressed the measurement of liabilities and the treatment 
of different cohorts of policy holders by age or by type of guarantee. After long 
deliberations between the regulators and industry practitioners, several changes have 
been introduced. Pension institutions are now required to undertake a decomposition of 
their technical provisions by the level of guaranteed interest rate. They are also required 
to measure their pension and insurance liabilities by using a zero-coupon yield curve that 
is published daily by the Danish central bank. In addition, pension institutions must 
report the mortality tables they use for determining their actuarial liabilities. Finally, they 
must stipulate very clearly their policies of distributing profits between shareholders and 
policy holders and among different categories of policy holders.  
4  THE PERFECT STORM 
Up until 2000 it seems as if pension institutions only looked at the financial risks 
on the asset side of the balance sheet. The market risks related to the liability side, i.e. 
interest rate guarantees and other embedded options, were neither priced nor hedged. The 
occasional worries about the ticking guarantee bomb were easily put to rest by the highly 
positive market performance that ensured ample asset cushions to support the guarantees. 
Global interest rates had been slowly falling for more than 15 years and equity prices 
rising – especially in the late 1990s – and the Danish pension sector generated a high 
return on investments (Table 9). 
However, the financial climate changed dramatically in 2001 following the 
bursting of the high-tech bubble. Like most pension funds in developed countries the 
Danish pension sector was hit in several areas: 
•  The significant fall in nominal interest rates brought the interest rate 
guarantees in the money, which exposed pension institutions to 
substantial losses, capital drainage and potential solvency problems.  
•  While the falling interest rates meant a gain on the bond portfolio, this 
was not enough to cover the increased provisions. Since assets, consisting 
largely of domestic callable mortgage bonds, were far less sensitive to 
interest rate movements than liabilities, the gap between the two sides of 
the balance sheet widened considerably. 
•  The worst hit though came from the collapse of global equity prices, 
which in 2001 turned total investment returns negative. A repeat of this 
result in 2002 was only prevented by a large return on bonds (Figure 3). 
   13






















































These events coincided with the introduction of new accounting rules, requiring 
more frequent and mark-to-market valuation of the balance sheet, and implementation of 
the traffic light system, which also helped underscore the difficult situation of the pension 
sector. 
Table 9: Return on Investments for Life Insurance Companies and General Pension Funds 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Return on investments before tax  5.65  -1.63  1.77  6.86  10.40  14.25 
Return on investments after tax  4.95  -1.20  1.71  6.05  9.11  12.46 
Source: Danish FSA 
 
The Danish experience highlights the potential advantages of introducing such 
regulatory and accounting changes during times where financial markets are calm. The 
combination of turbulent financial markets and dramatic rule changes may force 
individual institutions to implement myopic solutions to survive to the detriment of long-
term performance maximization. 
5  THE GROWING USE OF DERIVATIVES 
The impact of the perfect storm illustrated an essential point about the balance 
sheet of the Danish pension institutions, namely the mismatch between the two sides. 
Getting a better match on the balance sheet involves managing both liabilities and assets, 
but since little can be done in the short run to directly change the structure of liabilities   14
that consist of future pension obligations, the focus was by necessity on optimizing asset 
allocation policies and on a more intensive use of hedging instruments. 
Even though asset allocation has been changed by, for example, the significant 
addition of foreign bonds with longer duration, the biggest impact was achieved by the 
growing use of derivatives to hedge against potential risks, which, as Figure 4 illustrates, 
has grown virtually exponentially since 2000. 







































































































































































Source and Notes: Danish FSA 
/1: The numbers do not include the substantial amount of written options the institutions 
carry on their balance sheets from investing in callable mortgage bonds. 
 
The major areas of market risk exposure of the Danish pension sector are: 
•  Interest rates are without comparison the largest risk factor, because of the interest 
rate guarantees on the liability side and the lack of interest rate sensitivity on the 
asset side. 
•  Equity prices have also proven to be a considerable risk factor. Most Danish 
pension institutions seized the opportunities arising from deregulation to increase 
their holdings of equities, especially foreign, thus leaving them exposed to the more 
volatile equity market.  
•  Currency exposure: Investments in foreign assets (especially foreign equities) are 
usually not hedged back to Danish Kroner. In the long run the expected return on 
this embedded currency exposure is zero, implying any gains and losses will even 
out over time. However, in the short to medium term currency fluctuations can be a   15
major component of the returns (measured in DKK) as well as the risk of 
international investments. 
The accounting implications of the exposure to both interest rate and equity risk 
have been further accentuated by the implementation of frequent mark-to-market 
valuations as even short-term market volatility has an immediate impact on the balance 
sheet. 
These different kinds of risk exposure can in general be hedged through the use of 
derivatives. The most common derivatives used by Danish pension institutions to hedge 
interest rate risk are interest rate swaps, swaptions (i.e., options to enter into swaps) and 
constant maturity swap (CMS) floors.  
The simplest of these instruments is the interest rate swap. A swap is an 
instrument where payment streams are exchanged. An interest rate swap typically lets the 
counterparts trade fixed interest rate payments for floating interest rate payments, thereby 
hedging the receiver of the fixed payments against interest rate fluctuations, in this case 
more specifically interest rate decreases.  
A swaption is an option to buy or sell a swap at a specific price at a specific point 
in time. In this case, as before, bought swaptions are used as a shield against a fall in 
interest rates. For example, the pension institution buys a swaption that allows it to enter 
an interest rate swap to receive fixed payments, if the interest rate falls below a certain 
level, thereby ensuring a minimum payment.  
A CMS floor is a further bundling of the instruments mentioned above. It is a 
series of interest rate swaps that expire at fixed intervals. The fixed interest rate of the 
swap is reset at each expiration point and is usually tied to an underlying asset with a 
longer maturity than the contract itself. Furthermore, the CMS floor contains a restriction 
as to how low the fixed interest rate can get, thereby putting in a floor that limits the 
potential decrease in the fixed payments. 
The derivative most commonly used to hedge or gain equity risk exposure is a 
futures contract. Futures contracts are standardized, exchange-traded contracts to buy or 
sell an underlying asset, in this case equity, at a specific price at a future date.  
Which instrument is used depends on several factors: 
•  Hedging strategy 
•  Contract pricing 
•  Market depth 
•  Counterparty credit risk exposure 
•  Regulatory requirements 
•  Experience 
 
Derivatives are not a new instrument for the Danish pension sector, which is very 
familiar with options through the vast portfolios of callable mortgage bonds and because   16
of restrictions on the portion of assets in foreign denomination
1 which are managed 
through the use of FX derivatives, predominantly FX forward contracts
2. However, it was 
not until late 2001, when the financial solvency situation was at its gravest, that 
derivatives became the risk hedging instrument of choice. 
6  THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF DERIVATIVES 
The financial impact of the use of derivatives can – at least partially – be shown 
by analyzing the aggregate interest rate sensitivity of the assets and liabilities of pension 
institutions before the use of derivatives and then looking at the net aggregate sensitivity 
after their use.  
As mentioned above, the Danish FSA performs stress tests on the balance sheets 
of the individual pension institutions measuring the effect of stipulated changes in interest 
rates. Four values are used: +1, +0.7, -0.7 and -1 percentage point. The following figures 
are constructed from these discrete data-points assuming a continuous non-linear 
relationship between the different discrete points.
3  
The interest rate sensitivity of the liabilities and the assets are first discussed, 
followed by the combined interest rate sensitivity of assets and liabilities. Then the 
interest rate sensitivity of derivatives is shown and finally the overall interest rate 
sensitivity of the total portfolio, including derivatives, is set out. This allows a fuller 
grasp of the transformation in the pay-off curve that was achieved by the use of 
derivatives. 
                                                 
1 To be more exact, 80 percent of the assets reserved to cover liabilities must be in DKK. 
2 A FX Forward contract is a contract to deliver or receive an amount of foreign currency at a future point 
in time. The price of a forward contract is the sum of the spot FX price plus the forward points. The 
forward points reflect the interest rate differential between the currencies exchanged at the time of 
exchange. 
3 This is an approximation which is unlikely to hold in reality. The non-linear nature of the derivatives on 
both the asset and liability side as well as the exotic nature of some of the bought/sold derivatives may 
result in discreet jumps in the sensitivity to interest rate changes. No data is available to support or refute 
these observations. However, it illustrates a general weakness in stress tests of this nature: A firm can target 
the effect of a specific interest rate change in a cheap way by buying protection for that particular point on 
the curve, but retaining – or even adding on to – risk just outside the point.    17
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Table 10: Interest Rate Sensitivity of Liabilities 
Interest Rate Change 
- 1%  - 0.7%  + 0.7%  + 1% 
10 Year government bond 
yield (end of period) 
 
DKK bn  Percent 
2002 66.0  42.2  -22.3  -48.0  4.46 
2003 52.0  31.9  -16.6  -20.5  4.47 
2004 76.1  49.0  -32.2  -42.3  3.85 
2005 112.4  72.7  -50.5  -67.1  3.28 
2006 (1
st half)  63.7  40.8  -24.9  -32.1  4.12 
Source: Danish FSA. Bloomberg (yields) 
Figure 5 and Table 10 above shows the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate 
liabilities and, for reference, the 10 Year government bond yield. Liabilities increase 
when interest rates go down (the net present value of future payments goes up) and fall 
when interest rates rise. The effect is not symmetric, however. When rates fall by 1 
percentage point, liabilities increase more than they fall when rates rise by 1 percentage 
point. This asymmetric effect can be attributed to the issued interest rate guarantees that 
gain in value rapidly when rates fall, while they have no value when rates are increasing 
from levels well above the guaranteed levels. This effect is visible in all the years 
illustrated above (2002 to 2006), but it is, as expected, more pronounced the lower the 
level of market interest rates. In 2005 when rates were at their lowest (see figure 3) the 
negative impact of a further fall in interest rates was the highest, as many of the issued 
interest rate guarantees were close to or already in the money. In that year a percentage 
point drop in interest rates would result in an increase in liabilities of DKK 110 bn.   18
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Table 11: Interest Rate Sensitivity of Assets 
Interest Rate Change 
- 1%  - 0.7%  + 0.7%  + 1% 
10 Year government bond 
yield (end of period) 
 
DKK bn  Percent 
2002 26.7  18.8  -19.0  -27.2  4.46 
2003 40.2  28.2  -28.5  -40.7  4.47 
2004 40.7  28.5  -28.9  -41.5  3.85 
2005 46.6  32.8  -33.4  -47.8  3.28 
2006 (1
st half)  46.2  32.4  -32.5  -46.4  4.12 
Source: Danish FSA. Bloomberg (yields) 
The interest rate sensitivity of assets show in Figure 6 and Table 11 reflects their 
composition, which is geared toward longer maturity government and mortgage bonds. 
The positive duration of these assets results in capital gains when rates go down and 
losses when rates go up. This relationship is observable in the aggregate numbers. The 
asset side does not show a similar asymmetric response to interest rate changes as the 
liability side. However, pension institutions invest heavily in callable mortgage bonds. 
When interest rates fall below a certain level, borrowers refinance their mortgage bonds 
and deny pension institutions an offsetting gain on the asset side. This particular feature 
aggravates the problems created by the asymmetric effect on the liability side. It is, 
therefore, somewhat surprising that the effect shown by the stress test is quite 
symmetric.
1 The absolute interest rate sensitivity of assets has in all the years been less 
than the interest rate sensitivity on the liabilities side, leaving the institutions with a 
substantial duration gap. 
                                                 
1 This may in part be because the measurement of the impact of the embedded options in mortgage bonds is 
incomplete. The embedded options in mortgage bonds are expected to result in smaller DKK gains when 
rates go down by 1 percentage point than the DKK loss when rates increase by 1 percentage point.   19
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Table 12: Interest Rate Sensitivity Without Derivatives 
Interest Rate Change 
- 1%  - 0.7%  + 0.7%  + 1% 
10 Year government bond 
yield (end of period) 
 
DKK bn  Percent 
2002 -39.9  -23.4  3.3  20.8  4.46 
2003 -11.8  -3.7  -11.9  -20.2  4.47 
2004 -35.4  -20.5  3.3  0.84  3.85 
2005 -65.8  -39.9  17.1  19.3  3.28 
2006 (1
st  half)  -17.5 -8.4  -7.6 -14.3  4.12 
Source: Danish FSA. Bloomberg (yields) 
The net interest rate sensitivity of the industry without taking into account 
positions in derivatives shows for most years a net loss when interest rates fall and a gain 
when they rise (Figure 7 and Table 12). In other words the liability side effects dominate 
those of the asset side. In addition, the gains from a 1 percentage point increase in rates 
are smaller than the losses from a similar reduction in rates, illustrating the compound 
effect of the asymmetric impact of interest rate changes on both the asset and liability 
side. In 2003 the pension sector was in a very peculiar situation where interest rate 
changes in any direction would have resulted in a deterioration of the balance sheet., The 
net interest rate sensitivity (without derivatives) of the industry as a whole has increased 
over time as the asset interest rate sensitivity has been unable to keep up with the effect 
of increased interest rate sensitivities on the liability side increasing the duration gap in 
the balance sheets.   20
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Table 13: Interest Rate Sensitivity of Derivatives 
Interest Rate Change 
- 1%  - 0.7%  + 0.7%  + 1% 
10 Year government bond 
yield (end of period) 
 
DKK bn  Percent 
2002 25.1  13.8  -6.8  -9.9  4.46 
2003 26.9  16.2  -6.9  -8.4  4.47 
2004 43.8  28.2  -16.3  -21.7  3.85 
2005 75.8  49.6  -31.2  -39.7  3.28 
2006 (1
st half)  43.4  26  -12.1  -14.1  4.12 
Source: Danish FSA. Bloomberg (yields) 
Figure 8 and Table 13 shows the interest rate sensitivity of the derivatives 
positions. In aggregate the pension sector has in all years used derivates to increase the 
duration of its assets. As discussed earlier, pension institutions have exchanged floating 
rate payments for fixed rate receipts in the Euro-swap markets, or bought derivative 
structures with floors resulting in receipts if rates go below certain levels. The floors (and 
other similar derivatives) have resulted in asymmetric interest rate sensitivities on the 
derivatives side. In effect the institutions bought convexity giving them a larger gain 
when interest rates fall compared to the losses they would suffer when rates go up. For 
example, in 2005 a 1 percentage point fall in interest rates would have produced a gain 
from derivatives of DKK 80 billion, whereas a 1 percentage point increase would have 
resulted in a DKK 40 billion loss. In addition the interest rate exposure from the use of 
derivatives increased over time, as shown by the successively higher level of losses from 
a 1 percentage point reduction in rates.   21
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Table 14: Interest Rate Sensitivity With Derivatives 
Interest Rate Change 
- 1%  - 0.7%  + 0.7%  + 1% 
10 Year government bond 
yield (end of period) 
 
DKK bn  Percent 
2002 -14.8  -9.6  -3.5  10.9  4.46 
2003 15.1  12.5  -18.8  -28.6  4.47 
2004 8.4  7.7  -13.0  -20.9 3.85 
2005 10.0  9.7  -14.1  -20.4  3.28 
2006 (1
st half)  25.8  17.6  -19.7  -28.3  4.12 
Source: Danish FSA. Bloomberg (yields) 
The net interest rate sensitivity of the industry in aggregate is illustrated in Figure 
9 and Table 14 above. By using derivatives the interest rate risk of the industry has been 
greatly reduced. Caps have clearly been put in place for a large portion of the industry as 
there is no difference in the losses sustained in 2003, 2004 or 2005 by a 1 or 0.7 
percentage point rise in interest rates. The “normal” relationship between interest rates 
and gains/losses that would be expected in the balance sheet of an institutional investor 
has been reestablished: when interest rates go up, capital losses are incurred, while when 
interest rates go down, capital gains ensue. In other words, the industry has succeeded in 
being net long duration.
1 This is the exact opposite of the situation without derivatives, 
where the effects of the liability side dominated those of the asset side, and the magnitude 
of change is significantly higher. In other words: derivatives have been used not only to 
change the risk profile in general but specifically to reduce overall interest rate risk. 
                                                 
1 It can be argued that if taking interest rate risk is not rewarded long term investors should not take any 
interest rate risk over and above what is needed to hedge their liabilities. If this holds true, the Danish 
industry has over-hedged, and would be better off not having a net long duration.   22
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Figure 10 above recapitulates the results of the preceding analysis and shows the 
combined effect of interest rate changes on the aggregate balance sheet of the industry 
with and without the use of derivatives for the years 2003 to 2005. It can be clearly seen 
that the use of derivatives has allowed the industry to completely transform the payoff 
curve from being negatively affected by interest rate declines to being positively affected. 
In addition the pension sector as a whole has been able by using derivatives to operate 
with substantially increased on-balance-sheet interest rate exposures, while protecting 
itself from the negative effects of interest rate falls through off balance sheet instruments. 
Through the use of derivatives, the industry has effectively avoided having to renegotiate 
the guaranteed contracts with policyholders. 
The overall net interest rate sensitivity of the industry has been reduced by the use 
of derivatives. In addition it is much less varying from year to year than the sensitivity 
without derivatives. The pension sector has used derivatives to lower risk. In addition it 
has used derivatives as a buffer for the large changes in sensitivities imported from the 
liability side in particular. This has allowed pension institutions to determine their asset 
allocation strategies somewhat independently from the liability side, using derivatives to 
cover any shortfall, and focusing on the residual net exposures.    23
7  CASE STUDIES 
To provide a better picture of the use of derivatives, than what the aggregate 
numbers presented in the preceding section are able to do, this section covers the 
individual and very different experience of 3 different Danish pension institutions. 
Danish pension institutions were not required until recently to provide any reports 
on their use of derivatives or their hedging activities. However, some information 
surfaced – mainly from the companies themselves - that can be used to shed light on 
different strategies that were used by pension institutions to deal with the financial effects 
of the perfect storm that hit them in 2001 and 2002. This section reviews the experience 
of three pension institutions: PFA, ATP and MP, covering respectively a coerced, 
proactive and passive strategy.  
7.1  PFA: A COERCED STRATEGY 
PFA is one of the largest life insurance companies in Denmark and was hit hard 
by the perfect storm. PFA has a lot of policies with 4.5 percent guaranteed interest rates 
on its books and together with the decrease in global interest rates this made the 
provisions for future obligations soar. The steep drop in equity prices following 9/11 
2001 was the straw that broke the camel’s back as the loss from equities caused the 
reserves to fall below the statutory solvency requirement in late 2001. The Danish FSA 
requested from the PFA to draw up immediately a capital restoration plan.  
The plan consisted of two key elements: 
•  Changing asset allocation by selling foreign equity
1 and buying foreign 
bonds with long maturity. This would both limit the risk of further losses 
on equities and add interest sensitivity to the balance sheet. 
•  Acquiring a CMS floor option contract
2 to curb the losses from interest 
rate decreases and remove some of the convexity of the balance sheet. 
Because of these measures PFA’s solvency was better in 2002, albeit still on the 
weak side. The PFA continued to focus on asset/liability management and active asset 
allocation by further reducing its equity holdings and increasing the interest rate 
sensitivity of its bond portfolio. In addition the PFA received subordinated loan capital 
from Danish banks early in 2002. The derivatives hedging strategy was unchanged as the 
CMS floor option was still running and even contributed positively by DKK 0.9 billion to 
the 2002 result. 
Having gained more experience with derivatives as hedging instruments, but also 
realizing the costs of this approach, it seems that the PFA in 2003 changed its hedging 
                                                 
1 The foreign equity sold had a value of DKK 21 billion, which amounted to 75 percent of PFA’s total 
equity holdings. 
2 The nominal value of the contract was DKK 50 billion and the strike rate was 5.3 percent, which equals 
the 4.5 percent guaranteed interest rate plus after revenue tax.   24
strategy and became more selective and sophisticated. The hedging strategy was also 
better integrated with the overall investment strategy
1. Derivatives contributed negatively 
by DKK 0.7 billion to the 2003 result. 
The PFA case illustrates how asset allocation and derivatives have been used in 
response to a serious crisis. The PFA was under pressure to improve its solvency 
immediately and had it not been for these drastic measures, it is conceivable that it might 
not have been able to weather the storm. However, the urgency of the situation also 
entailed high costs that probably could have been avoided, had the PFA previously 
acquired derivatives as hedging instruments. As management fought for the survival of 
the company how blunt or expensive an instrument was in the long run became irrelevant 
as long as it could help bring the company out of the immediate crisis.   
7.2  ATP: A PROACTIVE STRATEGY 
ATP is the largest supplementary pension administrator and one of the largest 
pension institutions in Denmark. It has always been on the forefront of financial 
management. Not being a pension institution in the traditional sense, ATP was not 
burdened by interest rate guarantees. However, the new accounting rules that required 
frequent mark-to-market valuation of the balance sheet had daunting prospects for ATP. 
ATP began using asset/liability management (ALM) principles for internal 
purposes as early as 1998, but only with book values. In 2001 the Danish FSA announced 
the new accounting rules and ATP concluded that the rules would significantly increase 
the risk of solvency problems as mark-to-market valuations revealed a mismatch between 
assets and liabilities
2.  
Alleviating the mismatch by active asset allocation, for example by selling short-
duration and buying long-duration assets, proved insufficient as the demand for long-
duration bonds far outweighed the supply
3. Therefore ATP decided to use derivatives as 
hedging instruments, more specifically euro interest rate swaps, as the best way to bridge 
the gap between assets and liabilities. This decision was neither easy nor obvious and it 
was partially made by the principle of exclusion. The key factors were
4:  
•  The DKK market was too small and without the necessary liquidity. The 
euro market was the most obvious solution for the volume needed. 
                                                 
1 PFA’s 2003 annual report speaks of securing “a better match between assets and liabilities” that “too 
much hedging can be expensive in terms of forgone income” and “the challenge is to find the right balance 
between solvency and return to policyholders”.  
2 Using market rates ATP estimated that a 1 percent decrease in interest rates would cause provisions for 
future obligations to increase by DKK 44 billion, but only increase assets by DKK 18 billion leaving a 
mismatch of DKK 26 billion. 
3 At the time ATP estimated that even if it bought all the outstanding long-duration Danish bonds, it would 
still not cover the interest rate sensitivity of the liabilities.  
4 Gosvig M., Wind L.   25
•  There would be no currency risk to speak of in holding euro interest rate 
swaps given the Danish exchange rate regime whereby the DKK is 
managed in a very narrow band against the Euro. 
•  Due to operational risk management procedures in ATP it would be a 
complicated, lengthy and costly process to use anything but plain vanilla 
derivative instruments, like swaps and futures. 
•  The futures market lacked the required depth. 
•  Swaps were seen as more cost efficient than futures and options as they 
typically have a longer maturity. 
Going ahead with its plan in late 2001, ATP acquired a very large euro interest 
rate swap contract
1. Because of the size of the deal the acquisition briefly caused interest 
rates to go up, resulting in an isolated loss on the swap holding of DKK 2.3 billion. In 
addition ATP increased the interest rate sensitivity of its bond portfolio as much as the 
market situation permitted.  
In 2002 ATP further increased its use of derivatives as it voluntarily complied 
with the Danish FSA’s market valuation reporting requirements, which had to be 
implemented no later than 2003. It more than doubled its holdings of interest rate swaps, 
which reduced the net interest rate sensitivity considerably and brought an almost perfect 
match between assets and liabilities
2. ATP also began using synthetic futures
3 as a means 
to hedge its equity portfolio from the fall in global equity prices
4. The reasons for using 
synthetic instead of traditional futures were that synthetic futures did not require a new 
operational setup and were the most cost efficient of the hedging instruments. The overall 
derivatives strategy was continued in 2003, and derivatives are now an integrated part of 
not only ATP’s ALM framework but its active risk taking. 
For ATP the use of derivatives turned out to be more than a hedging strategy. Its 
choice of interest rate swaps instead of, for example, a CMS floor option has been 
described as being on the aggressive side, as the interest rate swaps only work in ATP’s 
favor as long as interest rates are falling and in that sense it was a hard bet on market 
direction. Fortunately, it was a good bet. Not only did ATP succeed in proactively 
matching the sensitivity of assets and liabilities and curbing risk exposure in volatile 
areas, but derivatives contributed considerably to the bottom line
5 in 2002 and 2003 and 
as such proved a very profitable strategy. 
                                                 
1 The contract amounted to DKK 65.1 billion with an estimated interest rate sensitivity of DKK 9.3 billion, 
which was only around half of the board approved limit for interest rate derivatives.  
2 At the end of 2002 ATP estimated that a 1 percent decrease in interest rates would cause provisions to 
increase by DKK 34.6 billion but return on assets would follow suit by an increase of DKK 31.7 billion.  
3 The synthetic futures were constructed from OTC options by selling call options and buying put options 
with the same strike price.  
4 This partial hedge reduced the equity exposure from 25 percent to 17.9 percent of investment assets, 
amounting to a risk reduction of DKK 17.6 billion.  
5 Interest rate swaps added DKK 12.6 billion to the annual result in 2002 and DKK 2.1 billion in 2003.    26
7.3  MAGISTRENES PENSIONSKASSE (MP): A PASSIVE STRATEGY 
MP is the tenth largest pension institution, excluding the statutory supplementary 
pension funds, such as ATP. More than 90 percent of its schemes have a guaranteed 
interest rate of 4.25 percent or higher, making its liabilities very interest rate sensitive. 
Like other pension institutions with expensive interest rate guarantees on their 
books, MP was hit hard by falling global interest rates. The losses depleted its technical 
reserves
1, leaving it dangerously close to insolvency.  
Contrary to PFA and ATP, MP decided to ride out the storm. It used derivatives 
on a very limited scale and decided not to hedge interest rate risk, but rather to curb 
losses on its equity portfolio. MP’s few active steps to alleviate the situation included: 
•  In 2002 it sold domestic bonds and bought euro bonds with longer 
duration to increase the interest rate sensitivity of its assets. However, 
this only increased duration marginally
2 and assets and liabilities still 
remained significantly mismatched. 
•  Having seen its equity holdings reduced by close to 35 percent from 
2001 to 2002
3, it attempted to hedge against further losses by buying 
equity futures
4. This was the only use of derivatives. 
MP’s reasoning for this passive strategy was that at the time it considered the cost 
of derivatives too high compared to the benefits. Though, in hindsight the passive 
strategy did not come cheap, either, and the fundamental problems arising from the 
asset/liability mismatch were not solved. Currently, MP is using derivatives (swaps and 
swapoptions) both as long-term strategic instruments to hedge interest rate risk and to 
gain market exposure through the use of currency forwards, and equity options.  
7.4  LESSONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
The most important lesson to be learned from the three cases is probably that 
prevention is better than cure. Without comparison, ATP has been the one to fare best 
through the stormy waters, and to a large extent this can be attributed to its proactive 
approach to asset/liability management. As suggested by the experiences of both PFA 
and MP, dealing with a crisis after it arises comes at a premium and narrows down 
considerably the choice of strategy. 
Furthermore, the cases illustrate that derivatives are a very effective tool for 
bridging the gap between assets and liabilities. With the help of derivatives ATP has 
come close to a perfect match and PFA has managed to get its solvency situation under 
                                                 
1 MP’s technical reserves (base capital less solvency requirement / total liabilities) fell from 25.1 percent in 
late 2000 to 4.9 percent in late 2002, but improved to 8.7 percent in 2003.  
2 Duration on bonds was increased from 4.4 in 2001 to 7.0 years in 2002, but fell back to 5.1 in 2003. 
3 The equity portfolio decreased from DKK 12.6 billion in 2001 to DKK 8.2 billion in 2002 and slightly 
increased to DKK 8.3 billion in 2003.  
4 Equities were hedged by DKK 1.9 billion in 2002.   27
control. In addition, both institutions have gained valuable knowledge on how to prevent 
future crises.  
However, the experiences gained have been costly. Not only did the 
overwhelming demand for and scarce supply for long-duration assets push up the price 
on derivatives and, as in the case of MP, deter potential buyers, but the introduction of 
derivatives as hedging instruments brought along considerable internal costs stemming 
from necessary changes in internal procedures. Use of derivatives requires special 
administrative, legal, technical and human resources.  
The fact that in the case of ATP the size of the derivatives contract was large 
enough to have an impact on the otherwise very liquid euro market underlines that the 
market is still small, compartmentalized and relatively illiquid. Therefore the perfect 
match might not be attainable through derivatives alone.  
Neither are derivatives a quick or one-time only solution. Any hedging strategy 
needs to be carefully planned and closely monitored in order to be effective and even 
more so when dealing with fairly complicated instruments like derivatives. As the MP 
case shows, the impact of a temporary, partial hedge is exactly that, temporary and 
partial. Considering that pension sector liabilities are very sticky and that interest 
guarantees will continue to skew the balance sheet for many years to come, a long-term 
hedging strategy is needed. 
8  CONCLUSIONS 
Since their large scale industry-wide introduction in 2001, hedging instruments 
have been used successfully in Denmark to reduce interest rate and equity price risk. 
Derivatives, and the increased leverage they imply, have not increased overall exposure 
to market risks. On the contrary, derivatives have been used to significantly reduce the 
miss-match that existed between assets and liabilities. But they have increased exposure 
to operational and counterparty credit risk. As such they do not offer “a simple free 
lunch”. 
The experience of Danish pension institutions in the early 2000s shows that it is 
imperative to adopt a comprehensive framework in risk management and measure the 
combined net sensitivity to interest rates and asset prices of assets, liabilities and 
derivatives on a regular basis. One could argue that pension institutions, finally, have 
begun to catch up to other types of financial institutions when it comes to regulatory as 
well as economic financial risk management. The move has revealed larger risks in the 
balance-sheet of the pension institutions than what was counted in the old framework. 
The changes have, therefore, reduced the risk-taking capabilities of the pension 
institutions (for a given level of capital). Unfortunately, this reduction comes at a time 
where the levels of required returns are increasing due to e.g. improvements in longevity 
risks over and above the levels expected in the actuarial calculations. Higher level of 
required returns would imply more risk taking, not less. Derivatives can be used to hedge 
liabilities in such a way that both capital and risk budget can be freed up and employed   28
more gainfully in other (non-fixed income) asset classes, thereby increasing the return 
generating potential for any given amount of assets and capital. 
The use of hedging instruments is also indispensable when pension institutions 
offer products with embedded options. The Danish pension institutions have been able to 
transform the pay-off curve of their balance sheets and to contain their risk exposures 
while avoiding a renegotiation of old contracts and without withdrawing completely the 
offer of products with embedded options. 
Judicious use of derivatives would allow pension institutions to expand the offer 
of products with embedded options without assuming an intolerable exposure to interest 
rate and asset price risks. The solvency of pension institutions is determined by their 
combined asset, liability and derivative positions. However, the asset and liability 
composition provides an indication of the extent to which pension institutions offer 
products that meet the risk preferences of workers.  
Products with embedded options avoid the transfer of all market risks to 
policyholders, who are likely to be the least suited to bear and handle these risks. The 
demand for such products is likely to increase over time as employer-sponsored defined 
benefit pension plans are increasingly closed to new members and are effectively 
replaced with defined-contribution plans. Under the latter, retirement benefits depend on 
the performance of financial markets. Transferring all the financial risk to workers may 
be inadvisable and may expose large numbers of individual workers to large financial 
losses and inadequate pension benefits. 
However, successful use of hedging instruments would require sound derivative 
markets, sensible risk management practices, and effective regulatory oversight. All three 
would be critical elements for the sustainability of this approach.   29
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